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Abstract 
In this article we have tried to analyze “austerity surveillance” (AS), its features, and its functions under the extreme 
austerity regime in Greece during 2010−2014, before the election of the leftist government. AS is a specific kind of co-
ercive neoliberal surveillance, which in the name of fighting tax evasion and corruption is targeting the middle and low-
er economic strata and not the rich upper classes. It is based mainly on “coveillance,” i.e. citizen-informers’ grassing, 
public naming, and shaming. Functioning as a domination and disciplinary control mechanism of the entire population, it 
works within a post-democratic setting without accountability or democratic control. We provide empirical evidence of these 
features and functions, including some indicative personal testimonies of austerity surveillance subjects. After present-
ing some cases of electronic surveillance as an indispensable supplement to AS, we then briefly underline the negative 
personal, and socio-political impact of this surveillance. In conclusion, a tentative assessment is made of AS’ efficiency 
in the Greek case, comparing it with other types of past and present authoritarian surveillance in Greece and in other 
current surveillance societies, considering also the prospects for its abolition or its reproduction by the new leftist gov-
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1. Introduction 
According to Greek mythology, Argos Panoptes was a 
hundred-eyed giant, a very effective watchman, used 
by Zeus’ wife, Hera, to watch Zeus’ lover, Nymph Io. 
Zeus sent Hermes to rescue his lover, and Hermes slew 
Argos with his sword. To commemorate her faithful 
watchman, Hera had the hundred eyes of Argos pre-
served forever, on the peacock’s tail, her sacred bird. 
Panoptes (“All-seeing”) signifies on the one hand the 
wakeful alertness of a watchman, who had so many 
eyes that only a few of them would sleep at a time, 
while there were always eyes still awake.1 On the other 
hand, Argos Panoptes signifies surveillance as a very ef-
                                                          
1 See http://www.theoi.com/Gigante/GiganteArgosPanoptes.html 
fective, but also contested, control instrument, used by 
the powerful authorities. The questions of who is using 
Panoptes against whom, and for what reason, who 
trusts him and to whom he is faithful, and how one can 
get rid of him are eternal questions about surveillance, 
either in the case of spying enemies or allies, or simply 
of watching individuals, citizens, consumers, etc. Pan-
optes’ myth is always appropriate when talking about 
surveillance in Greece, especially nowadays when 
Greek people struggle against the draconian austerity 
regime and its Panoptes surveillance. 
Our analysis here refers to the austerity regime in 
Greece from 2010−2014, before the electoral victory of 
the leftist party SYRIZA on January 25, 2015 and the 
formation of Alexis Tsipras’ government. 
Although we live in the “age of austerity” (Schaefer 
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& Streeck, 2013) and most democratic states enforce 
austerity measures, these are particularly harsh in 
southern Europe, with Greece as the most extreme 
case. It seems that Greece has been chosen by the 
Troika, i.e. the IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB), 
and the European Commission (EC) as a laboratory for 
a new model of socioeconomic organization for the Eu-
ropean over-indebted countries. This laboratory aims, 
under extreme austerity and surveillance, to create a 
disciplined society, totally passive and receptive to the 
neoliberal policies of market domination and social dis-
integration (Douzinas, 2013; Stavrakakis, 2014). 
We have to remind one that Greece is the weakest 
member in the Eurozone debt crisis, which began to 
unravel in 2009. Worries that Greece would default on 
its debt forced the European Union (EU) to rescue the 
Greek economy with two bailouts, in 2010 and 2014, 
totaling €240 billion, under draconian memoranda for 
shrinking the public sector and enforcing severe con-
straints of social spending. Since the first bailout of 
Greece, an austerity regime has been established un-
der the strict supervision of the Troika, enforcing a ne-
oliberal austerity policy to save the Greek banks and 
pay off the lenders, but with detrimental results for the 
Greek population. According to data collected by Euro-
stat, the EU’s statistics agency, about 30 percent of the 
Greek population now lives below the poverty line—
with 15 percent living in conditions of extreme poverty.2 
The argument that Greece has been a “debt colo-
ny,” shackled to its lenders, sounds more and more 
persuasive. It is a subservient state to a trust of Euro-
crats, Euro-bankers, and neoliberal governmental elites 
in northern Europe, which collaborates with the Greek 
ruling elite to impose the neoliberal austerity doctrine, 
regardless of its apparent failure and detrimental im-
pact on the Greek people (Kotzias, 2012; Stavrakakis, 
2014; Tsimitakis, 2012). In order to impose strict aus-
terity measures, the pro-austerity Greek governments 
under the Troika pressures have de facto given up na-
tional sovereignty and continuously used undemocratic 
methods, like legislative ordinances, that circumvent 
the Greek constitution (Chrysogonos, 2013).  
This Greek austerity regime is organized according 
to the austerity memoranda, which have prescribed 
the rules, norms, and key austerity policies of govern-
ance, under the strict supervision of the Troika. The 
austerity governance was implemented by a coalition 
government of the traditional rival, post-dictatorial rul-
                                                          
2 About 1,000 more people lose their jobs every day, and long-
term poverty is knocking at the door of a new class of low-paid 
workers. Greeks’ purchasing power has fallen by half since 
2010; also, while the public healthcare system is being de-
stroyed and spending on public education has fallen to levels 
last seen in the 1980s, the cost of living in the country remains 
high. All these push the young educated Greeks to massively 
emigrate abroad (Tsimitakis, 2012). 
ing parties, i.e., the right-wing New Democracy party 
and the center-left “socialist” PASOK party, which are 
both responsible for Greek bankruptcy, due to their 
clientelist and corrupt politics. 
The Greek austerity regime has been using a specif-
ic type of surveillance, which we call “austerity surveil-
lance,” to create a coercive, insecure and disciplined 
society of informers; this type of surveillance and its 
impact we aim to analyze in this article. For our analy-
sis we have to consider that Greece is a post-
authoritarian surveillance society, which due to the 
post-civil war police state and military dictatorship 
(1949−1974) has resisted during the entire post-
dictatorial period and before the financial crisis 
(1974−2009) any kind of new, electronic surveillance 
(Samatas, 2004). Based on pretty good constitutional 
and legislative protections of freedoms and privacy, 
post-dictatorial Greece had a good record of privacy 
and data protection, as was confirmed by the EPIC sur-
vey of 2006, discussed further below. 
In this article we try first to define “austerity sur-
veillance” (AS), describing its features and functions, 
which reflect the extreme austerity regime in Greece 
during 2010−2014; second, we provide empirical evi-
dence of these features, and some indicative personal 
testimonies of austerity surveillance subjects; then, we 
present some cases of electronic surveillance, as an in-
dispensable supplement to the AS; then, we briefly un-
derline the impact of this surveillance, comparing it 
with other types of authoritarian surveillance in the 
Greek past as well as current coercive surveillance in 
advanced surveillance societies; finally, we conclude 
with a tentative assessment of the efficiency of AS in 
Greece and consider the prospects for the abolition or 
reproduction of the austerity surveillance by the new 
leftist government. 
We have tried to substantiate our arguments about 
the features of this particular type of surveillance with 
lots of empirical data. Also, as we have done with our 
research on anticommunist surveillance in Greece, 
where we had used an in-depth conversational analysis 
(Samatas, 2005), we have similarly examined “austerity 
surveillance” through “exploratory discussions” with a 
number of selected individuals who have been victims of 
or have resisted the austerity regime, discussing and lis-
tening to their narrative “stories,” following a similar 
narrative methodology with the IRISS report (2014, p. 4).  
2. The Features of “Austerity Surveillance” as a Basic 
Control Mechanism of the Greek Austerity Regime 
Surveillance implies power and control, since it means 
monitoring people, gathering and analysing personal 
information in order to regulate or govern their be-
havior (Gilliom & Monahan, 2013, p. 2). State surveil-
lance in a democratic setting can be an effective con-
trol mechanism provided that it is legitimate and 
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accountable, having the citizens’ acceptance and 
trust; because within a democratic setting there are 
rules of limitation and oversight of the watchers, pro-
tecting the watched (Haggerty & Samatas, 2010). 
However, in a draconian austerity regime such as the 
five-year austerity regime in Greece from 2010−2014, 
surveillance, as we’ll see, is a coercive, neo-
authoritarian mechanism that serves the ruling elite 
and the lenders’ interests, actually punishing ordinary 
citizens and harming democracy.  
In fact, “austerity surveillance” (AS) is a special kind 
of coercive surveillance, which has been used by the 
extreme austerity regime in Greece in the name of 
fighting tax evasion and corruption, while targeting the 
middle and lower economic strata—not the rich upper 
classes—is based mainly on “coveillance,” i.e., citizen-
informers’ grassing, public naming, and shaming. It in-
volves potential or actual coercion, stigmatization, and 
punishment as a domination and disciplinary control 
mechanism of the entire population; it functions in a neolib-
eral and post-democratic setting, namely without accountabil-
ity and democratic control. “Austerity surveillance” is not 
just a financial or credit surveillance, collecting and 
processing data on financial behavior; it is a surveil-
lance promoted by the austerity regime as a way of cit-
izens’ lives (Gilliom & Monahan, 2013, pp. 34-38), sus-
pecting and targeting every one as untrustworthy, a 
potential cheater, a tax evader, and corrupted. AS is 
not an original type of monitoring, since its mechanics 
have been dictated by the Troika and are imported 
from countries such as the UK, with an embedded 
“coveillance” culture of neighborhood watch (NW) and 
“citizens watching citizens” (CWC) (Rowlands, 2013; 
Webster & Leleux, 2014).  
2.1. The Basic Features of Greek Austerity Surveillance  
Austerity surveillance, as it has been developed during 
the years of crisis in Greece, reflects all features of the 
Greek austerity regime; it is basically coercive, neolib-
eral, post-democratic, and class-oriented.  
2.1.1. AS Is Coercive, Causing Stigmatization and 
Punishment 
Christian Fuchs (2012, p. 685) has underlined the coer-
cive features of surveillance in the capitalist context, 
which resemble with the coercive character of AS in 
Greece:  
[Surveillance] is the collection of data on individuals 
or groups to control and discipline their behaviour. 
It can be exercised through threats of targeting 
someone by violence....Surveillance operates with 
threats and fear; it is a form of psychological and 
structural violence that can turn into physical vio-
lence. Surveillance is a specific kind of information 
gathering, storage, processing and assessment, and 
its use involves potential or actual harm, coercion, 
violence, asymmetric power relations, control, ma-
nipulation, domination and disciplinary power. It is 
an instrument and a means for trying to derive and 
accumulate benefits for certain groups or individu-
als at the expense of other groups or individuals.  
AS implies actual violence, like arrest and imprison-
ment, and symbolic violence, such as public naming 
and shaming, as we analyze it further below. There 
have been numerous arrests and imprisonments of tax 
and loan debtors, after citizens’ accusations and 
“snitching.” 
We can also use Lazzarato’s (2012) analysis of the 
function of debt equally for the “debt or austerity sur-
veillance” as “a technique of domination, as a technol-
ogy of power, combining financial management with 
control over subjectivity.”  
2.1.2. AS Is a Neoliberal Control Mechanism Especially 
Targeting Public Servants and Welfare Recipients 
The Greek austerity regime, under the Troika’s tutelage 
and direct supervision, has enforced a neoliberal policy 
of defaming everything relating to the state and public 
sector; neoliberalism is a market rationality that colo-
nizes most spheres of public life, “pushing responsibil-
ity onto individuals for what used to be the purview of 
the state, effectively depoliticizing social problems and 
normalizing social inequalities…The convergence of 
surveillance and neoliberalism supports the production 
of insecurity subjects, of people who perceive the in-
herent dangerousness of others and take actions to 
minimize exposure to them, even when the danger is 
spurious” (Monahan, 2010, pp. 2, 11). 
2.1.3. AS Is Working Under a “Post-Democratic Setting”  
Post-democratic is, according to Crouch (2004, p. 6): 
one that continues to have and to use all the insti-
tutions of democracy, but in which they increasing-
ly become a formal shell....Elections and electoral 
debate, which can still change governments, are 
transformed into a “tightly controlled spectacle,” 
managed by professional experts and restricted to a 
set of issues selected by them, with most citizens 
reduced to a passive, apathetic role. 
All these post-democratic features have characterized 
the five years (2010−2014) of the Greek austerity re-
gime. In this setting, AS is actually antidemocratic be-
cause it is functioning without any democratic control 
and accountability, violating privacy, human rights, and 
constitutional freedoms. 
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2.1.4. AS Is Class-Oriented, Against the Lower Social 
Strata, Protecting the Rich Dominant Classes 
As we prove later, AS, like the austerity regime, is 
overtly class-discriminatory against the lower middle 
classes, the poor, and the needy, and conspicuously in 
favor of the elite and rich upper strata. 
In brief, “austerity surveillance” in Greece is a coer-
cive or neo-authoritarian type of surveillance, using 
stigmatization by naming and shaming, encouraging 
citizen informants, besides the advanced surveillance 
technologies. It is targeting every citizen as a “debtor,” 
owing his own share of debt, and as a potential tax 
evader, accountable and guilty before the austerity re-
gime. With neoliberal fierceness, it firstly attacks the 
public sector servants and functionaries, all welfare re-
cipients, and then private sector professionals. “At the 
end of the day, a ‘pound of flesh’ is demanded from 
all—with the normal exclusion of the politico-economic 
elite of the super-rich” (Stavrakakis, 2013). 
3. The Basic Mechanics and Functions of the AS in 
Greece 
The following are a wide and interesting range of ex-
amples, illustrating the aforementioned mechanics and 
functions of austerity surveillance in Greece. 
3.1. “Coveillance”: Grassing, Naming, and Shaming for 
the Austerity Regime by Citizen Informants 
The austerity regime cultivates “coveillance,” a kind of 
horizontal surveillance by citizens who have the “duty 
to inform” on their fellow citizens; it is an “outsourc-
ing” of state institutional control and surveillance re-
sponsibility to the Greek public, as it is practiced in 
several countries, especially in the UK.3 So, for exam-
ple, in Scotland, the “Made from Crime” initiative en-
courages people “to eye one another suspiciously,” 
and to monitor each other’s living arrangements: “How 
can he afford that flash car? How did she pay for all 
those designer clothes? How can they fund so many 
foreign holidays?” Citizens’ reports can be made by 
post, online, or by phoning, anonymously, with no evi-
dential requirements or limit to the frequency and 
number of accused people.4  
                                                          
3 In recent years, a plethora of UK government publicity cam-
paigns have urged the public to report those who exhibit suspi-
cious behavior in relation to a wide range of offenses, including 
terrorism, benefit fraud, social housing violations, bad driving, 
and even the improper use of rubbish bins” (Rowlands, 2013). 
4 Indicative enough is the British government’s scheme in No-
vember 2009 that would pay £500 to the first 1,000 people 
whose telephone tip-offs led to a council house being repos-
sessed (Rowlands, 2013). 
3.1.1. Hotlines 
Similarly, we also have in Greece, under the austerity 
regime, anonymous tip-offs, which can be made by 
post, online, or by phoning the following hotlines:  
 1517, the most popular and busiest hotline, for 
accusations to the Greek Financial and Economic 
Crime Squad (SDOE); 
 11012 for the Economic Police, who receives 50 
calls per day; 
 10190 for corruption cases to the International 
Transparency of Greece; it received 500 calls in 
2013;  
 1142 for the Health line against smoking in public 
places and other health issues, which received 
20,000 calls against smokers in the first days of its 
establishment in 2010, but it receives less and less 
calls because the antismoking campaign has failed 
and no sanctions are imposed.  
 2313-325.501 in Northern Greece for accusations 
on environmental pollution, receiving 40-50 calls 
per day in the wintertime, when people burn un-
suitable materials in their fireplaces to keep 
warm. 
Reports can be made anonymously and with no evi-
dential requirements. There are many instances of 
people claiming to have endured financial hardship and 
lengthy legal battles due to spurious allegations made 
by vindictive neighbors, relatives, divorcees, rivals, etc.  
According to journalist sources: the SDOE hotline 
1517, which was established in 2008 for tax evasion, 
had received 4,000 telephone calls in 2008 and 4,500 in 
2009, and since a 2010 media campaign there has been 
a significant increase, having received 18,500 accusa-
tions of all forms, and 19,500 in 2011, while in the fol-
lowing years of 2012−2014 these accusations have 
been doubled. It is estimated that starting in 2014, this 
hotline receives an average of 200 calls per day and 
close to 70,000 calls per year (Elafros, 2015; Margome-
nou, 2014). According to SDOE statistics, six out of ten 
calls are made by relatives; 20 percent are accusations 
against rivals in the same business, or come from em-
ployees who have been fired and who accuse their 
former employers of tax evasion. Indicative enough is 
the fact that the percentage of named accusations is 
increasing, allegedly by taxpayers accusing others of 
tax evasion. SDOE has admitted that it has successfully 
arrested some serious tax evaders thanks to informers. 
Moreover, according to Law 3610/2007, “whoever 
has denounced a tax or customs offense to the authori-
ties, and this denunciation has been confirmed and 
punished by the enforcement of a pecuniary fine, s/he 
is entitled an award equal to 1/10 percent of the col-
lected fines.”  
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3.1.2. Public Naming and Shaming 
Citizens’ grassing reports on their relatives, neighbors, 
and fellow citizens is supplemented by public naming 
and shaming policies organized by the austerity regime 
authorities and the media, as an integral practice of 
austerity surveillance. 
According to Lilian Mitrou (2012, pp. 247-248): 
by “naming” we understand the disclosure, publica-
tion and dissemination of the identity of a person, 
who is convicted or suspected of crime or tax eva-
sion….The [stigmatizing] publicity serves as a means 
to degrade, shame, reprimand, reproach, censure, 
control…the person identified as offender, raising 
sentiments of guilt and shame….“Shaming” is a so-
cial process of purposefully expressing disapproval 
and/or contempt…provoking embarrassment, dis-
comfort, anger and fear.  
Shaming through publicly naming suspects, accused, 
and convicted persons as tax evaders by the Greek 
media throughout the austerity years aims at public 
condemnation and hopes to create deterrence effects.  
Greece had very good legislation on the protection 
of personal data, which has been gradually but serious-
ly amended to facilitate organized crime prevention, 
antiterrorism, and austerity policies, including tax eva-
sion. In 2007, there was an amendment of Law 
2472/97 on the protection of personal data, allowing 
the publication of the names of persons involved in 
criminal charges or convictions. Yet, the naming and 
shaming policies that had been introduced into Greek 
legislation in 2008 became an obligation of tax authori-
ties against tax evaders since 2011 (Mitrou, 2012). 
3.1.3. Humiliation and Defamation: Tax Evaders Are 
Frequently Considered Equal to Sex Offenders and 
Pedophiles 
The implementation of these naming and shaming pol-
icies by the Greek authorities and the media has actual-
ly put tax evaders on the same level as serious crimi-
nals, sex offenders, and pedophiles, assuming that 
their public naming will deter other tax offenders. In 
the Greek social context, especially in local communi-
ties, public naming and shaming are serious policies to 
implement punishment, because the offenders fear 
“the look in the eyes of his intimates, family, friends, 
and colleagues, who know about their behavior.” The 
community participates in the punishment process by 
disgracing, degrading, and stigmatizing the offender, 
imposing restrictions to his freedom, chances, and 
choices (Mitrou, 2012, p. 251).  
The most blatant public and online stigmatization, a 
privacy violation, forced DNA collection, and impris-
onment, was in May 2012, when the Greek authorities 
arrested 17 allegedly HIV-positive women who worked 
illegally as prostitutes, accusing them of intentionally 
causing serious bodily harm. The photographs of 12 of 
the women were published by TV channels and to-
gether with their names were posted on the Greek Po-
lice’s website, causing an outcry of human rights advo-
cates who said it was unclear whether the women 
were aware they had HIV.5  
3.1.4. The Stigmatization Role of the Major Mass Media 
The print and electronic mass media play a crucial role 
in the efficiency of surveillance (Monahan, 2010); es-
pecially in the naming and shaming process, they have 
overdone this during the austerity years in Greece, re-
producing over and over the austerity regime’s propa-
ganda that most public servants and professionals are 
corrupted and are mainly responsible for the crisis. In 
very few cases when there is a celebrity arrest for tax 
evasion, this is presented in a very reviling way by the 
electronic media, advertising the “efficiency” of the 
austerity regime. Anchor men and women of the major 
TV channels have made a career as “tele-prosecutors,” 
competing in the daily news programs to report in a 
very sensational way individual tax evasions cases, 
while they keep silence for huge tax evasion and off-
shore deposits of some of their colleagues and their 
bosses, the Greek “oligarchs,” the media barons and 
owners of the TV channels, who are also contractors of 
public works, and/or ship-owners, etc. and have not 
bothered to pay their taxes (Kontoyiorgis, 2013).  
3.2. Class Orientation and the Hypocrisy of the Greek 
Financial Big Brother  
The Finance ministry, under the supervision of the 
Troika and the head of the European Commission’s 
Task Force for Greece, Mr. Horst Reichenbach, was try-
ing to track down tax evaders by cross-matching con-
sumption data, unable though to identify those who 
have offshore accounts and money in Switzerland and 
in other tax-free paradises. Thus, the finance Big 
Brother is based on grassing and citizen informants, 
and exhausts its capacity to catch “small fishes.”  
There was also a proposed online publicity of in-
come data of all Greek taxpayers, after the law 
3842/2010, article 8 paragraph 20, that has permitted 
a total economic transparency, to enhance tax pay-
ments versus tax evasion, but this has not yet imple-
mented, because the Greek Data Protection Authority 
(DPA) has prohibited the online posting of income data 
(Opinion 1/2011), suggesting less intrusive measures.  
The fact that the Greek state with its financial sur-
veillance is unable to arrest the enormous tax evaders 
                                                          
5 See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/03/greece-
prostitutes-hiv-arrests_n_1473864.html 
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of the economic elite is illustrated in several lists with 
names of those who have deposited large funds in 
Switzerland and other offshore accounts, avoiding the 
payment of taxes in Greece.  
3.2.1. The “Lagarde List” 
The odyssey of the notorious “Lagarde list” exemplifies 
the typically lax and hypocritical attitude of all Greek 
governments and especially of this austerity regime 
toward real, very rich tax offenders. This list is a 
spreadsheet containing over 2,000 names of possible 
Greek tax evaders with undeclared large deposits at 
Swiss HSBC bank’s Geneva branch, part of thousands of 
such customers’ names, allegedly stolen by Herve Fal-
ciani, a computer technician of the bank, who at-
tempted to sell them to several governments. It is 
named after former French finance minister Christine 
Lagarde, who passed it on to the Greek government in 
October 2010 to help them tackle tax evasion. The list 
was hidden by Greek officials, and it became known 
two years later when it was published by investigative 
journalist Costas Vaxevanis (2012). Former finance 
minister George Papaconstantinou was found guilty by 
the Special Court of tampering the spreadsheet and 
erasing names of his relatives on this list. Furthermore, 
the subsequent finance minister Evangelos Venizelos 
had forgotten the CD in his office for long time. To 
date, despite the public outcry, very few names on this 
list have been audited.6 
There is also another list, from the Bank of Greece, 
of 54,000 people, who during the time of economic cri-
sis took a total of €22 billion out of the country, and 
which seems will take many years to be investigated.  
Another indicative example of hypocritical financial 
policy is the fact that on March 12, 2012, the pro-
austerity government under the non-elected premier-
ship of Eurobanker Loukas Papademos passed article 
19 in an irrelevant law 4056/2012 about cattle breed-
ing (!), abolishing a previous law 3399/2005 which es-
tablished the information exchange between Greece 
and Anguilla, an offshore paradise, covering up huge 
tax evasion of several well-known Greek entrepreneurs 
(Akritidou, 2012, p. 28).  
3.2.2. The “Tiresias” Black and White Lists 
Let’s compare now the above lists of mostly wealthy 
tax evaders with the Tiresias black and white lists. “Ti-
resias SA” is a private interbank company, named after 
the mythological blind prophet Tiresias; it collects and 
holds information on the economic behavior of all 
businesses and bank customers in Greece.7 Legalized 
                                                          
6 See http://greece.greekreporter.com/2015/02/09/86-names-
missing-from-lagarde-list 
7 See http://www.tiresias.gr 
by Law 3746/2009, every bank customer is recorded 
and every payment delay of over 20 euros (!) is black-
listed for at least 5 years, regardless if this payment has 
been finally made. Hence, thousands of firms and indi-
viduals are blacklisted, stigmatized, and excluded by 
the Greek banking system, even for very small amounts 
of unpaid bills. There is also a Tiresias “white list” for all 
those bank customers with good credit, or those who 
have only once delayed a payment, or for those who 
are considered precarious for the future. Direct access 
to the Tiresias black and white lists is possible for eve-
ryone who pays a small fee, and the service is called a 
“check.” Tiresias’ lists’ data are used by mushrooming 
private firms, which collect unpaid dues, exercising dai-
ly telephone bullying to debtors, pressing them to pay.8  
Our comparison of the preferential treatment of 
the very wealthy tax evaders of the Lagarde list vis a vis 
the Tiresias black list, which names mostly petty entre-
preneurs for bad credit, or thousands of defaulters 
who are unable to pay their commercial or house 
loans, elucidates the class discrimination of the Greek 
austerity regime and its expedient class-oriented sur-
veillance.  
3.3. Some Interesting Personal Testimonies  
We now recount some personal testimonies from indi-
viduals experiencing austerity surveillance in Greece. 
As we have done with our research on anticommunist 
surveillance, where we had used in-depth conversa-
tional analysis (Samatas, 2004, 2005), we also analyze 
austerity surveillance here through “exploratory dis-
cussions” with a number of selected individuals who 
have either been watchers or watched, discussing and 
listening to their narrative “stories.” From our narrative 
interviews with AS subjects, we cite here some charac-
teristic excerpts, like the IRISS (2014) methodology.  
After a malicious anonymous accusation against our 
dentist, who is an active citizen in voluntary organiza-
tions in our town, the SDOE visited his office and his 
house and for three days, looking for any evidence, 
even through family relics, to substantiate the accused 
illegal wealth, which there was none of to be found. 
The dentist, who after that event suffered a heart at-
tack, told us:  
My grandfather had narrated to me notorious sto-
ries during the Nazi occupation of Greece when 
“Greek” collaborators having covered their face 
with hoods were regularly nailing and pointing out 
                                                          
8 See more at  http://www.balkaneu.com/tiresias-information-
system-purchase information/#sthash.BIGoWA3p.dpuf 
In the UK the private company “HR Blacklist” collects and files 
data against activists, union members, etc., selling them to 
employers, who exclude them from the labor market (Akriti-
dou, 2012). 
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persons to the German army to be executed based 
on real or false accusations of resistance. Nowa-
days, dishonorable “roufianoi” (informers) are do-
ing a similar task, out of envy and malice… 
A relative of a merchant who committed suicide after 
his bank auction, eviction, and confiscation of his 
house has told us: 
Listen to me good! He did not kill himself; the bank 
killed him! The f. bank gave him no chance to post-
pone payments of his loan, to pay later; they had 
started a fast track process to get his house and 
throw him and his family [of 3 kids] out of it. Do you 
wonder why I’m so glad every time those who are 
called “anarchists,” “hooded,” or you name them 
burn the bank’s ATM? 
A woman collecting rubbish leftovers from an outdoor 
vegetable market:  
I’m looking everywhere, even in rubbish bins, for 
some food or for something valuable to be sold; I’m 
ashamed to do this, but what else can I do? We all 
had a good household, but now we have become 
beggars. 
This poor woman and the plethora of garbage pickers 
who flourish during this age of austerity are still lucky 
enough, because we don’t have yet in Greece the 
CCTV monitoring the rubbish bins as they do in many 
UK neighborhoods (Haggerty, 2012, p. 241). 
An SDOE financial prosecutor has stated: 
We don’t have enough personnel to check the sky-
rocketing number of phone calls snitching tax eva-
sions. Most of these calls are made by relatives 
against relatives, wives against their former hus-
bands, accusations about inheritance, agricultural 
land, even accusations when someone appeared 
with a new car in the neighborhood. In short, 
snitching is developing as a national sport during 
the crisis.9  
4. Austerity Surveillance in Greece Is Supplemented 
by a Variety of State Electronic Surveillance: Phone 
Taps, Communications Interceptions, Internet 
Tracking, etc. 
Phone taps, lawful with due process and unlawful by 
state agencies and private surveillants, have been sig-
nificantly increased all over the world (Landau, 2010; 
Marx, 2002), and especially in Greece during the finan-
cial crisis under the austerity regime. This is an indica-
                                                          
9 For similar statements, see www.tovima.gr/opinions/article/ 
?aid=709572 
tion of the insecurity of the austerity regime and the 
inability of the pertinent data and communications 
protection authorities to control the galaxy of private 
interceptions and the personal data market. Therefore, 
we consider phone taps a significant supplementary 
mechanism of the austerity surveillance. 
According to the Hellenic Authority for Communica-
tion Security and Privacy (ADAE), in 2012 state authori-
ties’ waivers of confidentiality for telephone conversa-
tions due to national security, that is without a due 
process to justify the reason, numbered 2,634, more 
than those waivers following the due process, which 
were 2,055. These figures show that within two years 
of the beginning of the crisis, the “lawful” telephone 
interceptions were ten times more. 
According to ADAE, the Greek Police and the Na-
tional Intelligence Service (EYP) had over 50,000 
phones tapped in 2012. The mobile phone companies 
have reported security problems with their networks. 
Also, there are accusations by political parties that 
their headquarters’ phones are tapped (Karanicas, 
2015; Lambropoulos, 2012). 
Further, in 2013 the request for authorities’ waivers 
of confidentiality for telephone conversations, due to 
national security, were 4,141, double that of 2012, and 
more than all waivers during the pre-crisis period of 
2005−2009, plus 2,700 phone taps for clearing serious 
crimes (see Table 1).10  
Table 1. EYP’s waivers of telephone conversations’ 
privacy. 
Year For Serious 
Crimes 
For National 
Security 
Total 
2005 144 55 199 
2008 607 302 909 
2010 2281 1169 3450 
2011 1743 3472 5215 
2012 2055 2634 4689 
2013 2700 4141 6841 
Source: This list is based on a combination of data from 
www.adae.gr and Efimeros (2014). 
Social media are also targeted by the Greek Police and 
EYP; they have requested in the first six months of 2013 
the personal data of 141 Facebook users; according to 
journalist sources, Facebook gave data for 66 of them.11 
Another controversial case is the well-publicized 
“Cyber Crime Unit of the Greek Police,” which has suc-
cessfully averted lots incidents of suicide, cyber bulling, 
and has arrested pedophiles. However, the problem 
with this unit is that to fulfill its goals it continuously 
tracks the entire cyberspace, and to act efficiently and 
on time it cannot follow legal due process; this is a fact 
not admitted to by the Greek police. 
                                                          
10 www.adae.gr and Efimeros (2014). 
11 www.in.gr (Aug. 28, 2013). 
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Moreover, the police surveillance has been inten-
sive and coercive against citizens and activists, even 
toward school students and whole families participat-
ing in the anti-gold mining movement and protests, 
which have been taking place in the gold-mining area, 
Skouries, in northern Greece. 
In addition, there is cell phone interception by the 
Greek authorities, as Vodafone has acknowledged. Ac-
cording to The Guardian’s list, based on the Vodafone 
report, “Law Enforcement Disclosure Report,” pub-
lished June 6, 2014, Vodafone in Greece in 2013 re-
ceived from Greek agencies a total of 8,602 metadata 
and content requests through the corporate telecom 
system, a proportionately very high amount of gov-
ernment surveillance (Garside, 2014). 
5. The Greek Austerity Regime Is Under Surveillance 
by the Troika and Allies 
The implementation of the austerity memoranda im-
plied a direct Troika supervision of the state financial 
ministries; e.g. the secretariat of fiscal revenues is 
considered an informal fiefdom of the Troika. There is 
a direct intervention by the special Task Force under 
Mr. Reichenbach, having in most ministries about 400 
representatives (Kotzias, 2013, pp. 332-342). As it was 
also confirmed by Mr. Fotis Kouvelis, the former pres-
ident of the “Democratic Left,”, a party which was a 
member of the coalition government under the ND 
Antonis Samaras premiership, there are Greek in-
formers within the state apparatus providing detailed 
data to the Troika’s technocrats about all contentious 
issues. This Troika’s inside information has given 
lenders an advantage in the negotiation with the 
Greek government.12 
In addition to Troika’s supervision, there is continu-
ous surveillance of the Greek austerity regime by Euro-
pean and American allies.13 According to the newspa-
per Ta Nea (Karanicas, 2014, pp. 1, 14-15), Greece is 
among the 196 countries that are currently being mon-
itored by the German Federal Intelligence Service 
(BND) since April 2010. Based on relevant documents 
of a dispute between a German lawyer and BND, a Eu-
roparliament study, and a Spiegel magazine report, Ta 
Nea revealed that BND has been monitoring Greece 
through three telecommunication companies, 
OTEGlobe, Forthnet, and Cyprus’ CYTA, which are cur-
rently cooperating with DE-CIX, the largest telecom 
provider in Germany (Karanicas, 2014).  
                                                          
12 See http://www.capital.gr/story/2281975 
13 In June of 2013, Edward Snowden revealed documents 
showing how the American NSA is bugging its European allies, 
the EU headquarters, 38 embassies, and UN missions, including 
the Greek ones, using an extraordinary range of spying meth-
ods (MacAskill & Borger, 2013).  
6. The Austerity Surveillance’s Impact and 
Implications 
6.1. Detrimental Personal and Social Impact 
A decent society and a democratic liberal state should 
respect and protect citizens from humiliation and stig-
matization. Shaming hurts the ethical and psychologi-
cal integrity of a person, contrary to the human rights 
and the values of a state of justice. In contrast to Greek 
culture, which celebrates a good neighborhood with 
open doors, community solidarity, social cohesion, and 
harbors disgust toward police informers due to 
Greece’s authoritarian past, the Greek austerity au-
thorities encourage the public to report anyone they 
perceive to be living beyond their means, or suspected 
of benefit fraud, illegal wealth, corruption, etc.  
However, the austerity surveillance by the public 
exposure of personal economic data and the encourag-
ing of one citizen watching and reporting on another, is 
a very controversial policy supported by the state, 
which may imply related crimes, like extortion, black-
mail, robberies, etc. Further, when honest taxpayers 
are urged by the state to report suspected neighbors of 
offending their tax obligations, this state admits its in-
stitutional failure and inability to check tax evasion. Cit-
izens’ grassing is constructing a society of informers, 
with social cohesion seriously eroded and where the 
privacy rights and liberties of the people next door are 
infringed upon. Public naming and shaming of a person 
accused of or convicted for a crime is degrading and 
humiliating, injuring social dignity and reputation, 
threatening relationships, social status, employment, 
and life chances (Mitrou, 2012, pp. 253-254). The ac-
cused, the arrestees, and the suspects of tax evasion, 
who are not yet convicted, should not be deprived of 
their rights.  
Furthermore, the online naming and shaming im-
plies a perpetual online stigmatization, undermining 
the right to oblivion, i.e. the right to forget and to be 
forgotten. As Mitrou (2012, p. 255) points out, “due to 
the Internet’s perfect and perpetual memory it is be-
coming harder and harder for people to escape their 
past.” Moreover, the efficiency of shaming publicity, 
aimed to humiliate and stigmatize the offenders, 
seems to be questionable and undermines the reinte-
gration of the offender into society as it is very unlikely 
that shaming would lead extreme offenders to change 
behavior, it punishes and ostracizes even minor of-
fenders such as tax evaders, pushing them into a per-
manent underclass. 
This community stigmatization is one of the most 
serious latent factors of the dramatic increase of sui-
cides, especially in the Greek countryside. According to 
a research study, due to the austerity measures there 
was a 35.7 percent increase in total suicides in Greece 
during 2011−2013 (Branas et. al., 2015).  
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Regarding the efficiency of citizens’ grassing in the 
UK, only one in every six calls received by the organiza-
tion “Crimestoppers” has provided genuine infor-
mation on benefit fraud, and there was a meagre over-
all success rate of 1.32 percent (Rowlands, 2013). 
There is not yet an estimate of the success rate of 
these grassing reports in Greece. We should report 
here that when we discussed the issue of the afore-
mentioned hotlines with an informal focus group of 
various people around us, most ignored the existence 
of these hotlines; only two out of 12 of them, a lawyer 
and a public servant, knew their function, but no one 
knew the exact numbers of a single hotline.  
6.2. Rapid Decline of the Best Privacy Protection Record  
The constitutional, legislative, and institutional protec-
tion of privacy in Greece, as well as civil society’s re-
sistance against the Olympic CCTV cameras (Samatas, 
2007, 2008), were reflected in the results of an interna-
tional survey. In fact, Greece was recognized in 2006 as 
the highest privacy protection-ranking country (!) by 
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and 
Privacy International (PI) global study on “Privacy & 
Human Rights Report surveys developments in 47 
countries” (2006). However, the phone-tapping during 
and long after the Athens 2004 Olympics (Samatas, 
2010, 2014), and the easy mobile phone and internet 
interceptions by authorities and private intruders, have 
resulted in Greece’s low record (1) in the category of 
“communication interceptions” in this survey. Unfor-
tunately, Greece ever since, especially during this last 
period, under the draconian austerity regime against 
society and democracy, has definitely lost its “champi-
on” position in privacy and data protection, joining 
countries with a high record in violations in these is-
sues. Especially the Greek record concerning the seri-
ous issue of “personal data breaches” was and still is 
far worse, due to the illegal commerce of personal da-
ta, which is a very profitable business in Greece (Sama-
tas, 2004, pp. 128-130).14 
6.3. AS Has Reinforced the Mutual Mistrust between 
the Greek State and its Citizens 
Every legitimate “institutional surveillance” (Lianos, 
2003) presupposes trust in the state’s public and pri-
vate institutions. This institutional trust has never real-
                                                          
14 The Greek DPA has lately punished (DPA decision 100/2014) 
two marketing companies (PANNER and AddOne) that have il-
legally collected personal data of almost all Greek taxpayers, 
smuggled from the Secretariat of Information Systems of the 
Finance Ministry (Giannarou, Souliotis, & Hadzinikolaou, 2013). 
For such data aggregator companies, selling personal profiles 
in the USA, and considered “the little-known overlords of the 
surveillance society,” see Gilliom and Monahan (2013, p.43). 
ly existed in Greece, especially during the austerity re-
gime, which in the name of security and its fight 
against tax evasion violates privacy and personal data 
of all Greek citizens. 
In sharp contrast to other Europeans, there is an 
embedded mistrust and lack of institutional confidence 
that Greek citizens have expressed even before the cri-
sis for any state and police surveillance as well as any 
kind of data collection by the state authorities, even 40 
years after the collapse of the military dictatorship in 
1974 (Samatas, 2004). For example, according to the 
findings of the Flash Eurobarometer survey on data 
protection in the 27 EU member states, conducted in 
January 2008: while, in the eyes of most EU citizens (72 
percent), the fight against international terrorism is an 
acceptable reason to restrict data protection rights, 
Greeks express the highest suspicion about any provi-
sions that would allow authorities to relax data protec-
tion laws, even if this served to combat terrorism. 
Furthermore, according to the Special Eurobarome-
ter (European Commission, 2011) exploring the “Atti-
tudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the 
European Union,” Greek respondents appeared to 
have the lowest level of trust in most institutions and 
corporations and the highest levels of concerns in most 
examined categories. In particular, 83 percent of them 
stated that the government asks for more and more 
personal information, which was the highest figure 
among all countries, while 77 percent consider the dis-
closing of personal information a serious issue. Also, 
regarding concerns about tracking via mobile phone or 
mobile Internet, Greeks had once again the highest 
concern (65 percent). Further, more than half of the 
Greek respondents appeared to be concerned that 
their behavior is being recorded in a public space (54 
percent).  
This traditional mistrust of Greeks of their state in-
stitutions, and especially of state surveillance, due to 
the country’s authoritarian past, is a key issue in un-
derstanding the lack of any legitimacy of austerity sur-
veillance in Greece.15  
6.4. The AS Acts without Democratic Control and 
Accountability 
“Austerity surveillance,” as a basic control mechanism, 
which together with many other draconian austerity 
mechanisms and policies make up the austerity regime, 
create a coercive and insecure surveillance society 
                                                          
15 In fact, most Greek citizens have expressed mistrust before 
the crisis of almost all political, governmental, and judicial insti-
tutions, the police, the church, mass media, etc., except for the 
President of the Republic, the Fire Department, and the Na-
tional Weather Forecast (Public Issue survey 2008 at 
http://www.publicissue.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2008/12/institutions_2.pdf). 
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without democratic control and accountability. This re-
gime, which in the Greek case was based on a coalition 
government of the right-wing New Democracy (ND) 
party and the center-left PASOK party, reflects a “post-
political” era of professionalized “governance” beyond 
left and right, and favors all those who accept the aus-
terity propaganda that everyone in the public sector—
not the power elite—is corrupt and responsible for the 
crisis. The most favorable type of citizens are “snitch-
es,” who eagerly consider it their duty to watch and 
snitch to the officials on others’ misbehavior, trying to 
gain personal advantage (Haggerty, 2012, p. 237). 
We can correlate security with austerity policies 
and agree with Huysmans (2014), who argues that de-
mocracy becomes “at stake” as security and austerity 
policies threaten to hollow out human rights, compro-
mise privacy, and outflank rights to question, chal-
lenge, and scrutinize.  
6.5. “Sousveillance” and Resistance  
6.5.1. Sousveillance and Shaming against the Austerity 
Regime’s Elite 
One very resilient reaction against the austerity regime 
is “sousveillance,” surveillance from below, conducted 
mainly by young users of social media against the pro-
austerity government, MPs, journalists, Eurocrats, 
German leaders, etc. The electronic social media are 
full of such fierce, hateful defamation and mocking 
comments, frequently like a cyber bullying against all 
of the pro-austerity personas by anonymous or pseu-
donymous commentators. Even beyond the social me-
dia platforms, there has been frequent physical har-
assment of governmental ministers and MPs by 
indignant citizens in public spaces. However, the worst 
impact is an alarming increase of the far right, neo-
fascist party of “Golden Dawn,” which came in third in 
the elections of January 2015. 
The coercive austerity regime and its AS have 
caused a variety of everyday resistance efforts in 
Greece by private individuals, activists, NGO’s, opposi-
tion parties, etc. One extreme but explicit type of sur-
veillance resistance is the following one. 
6.5.2. Vandalism of Police CCTV Cameras 
According to official police data, through the end of 
November 2006, 180 CCTV cameras and/or their elec-
tronic operations boxes had been burned by radical 
groups (IOS, 2007). Police CCTV vandalism has contin-
ued, and by the end of 2013, 60 percent of all police 
CCTV cameras in the Athens metropolitan area were 
not working because they were vandalized, and there 
are no repair funds. Further, since the riots of 2008 up 
to the present, police and bank CCTV cameras are 
widely vandalized in the Athens metropolitan area. Al-
so, in January 2015, 27 police CCTV cameras in Athens 
were destroyed by sympathizers of prisoners accused 
of being terrorists. Therefore, the police often relies on 
footage from private CCTV cameras, which are mush-
rooming everywhere in Greece. Thus, we have an ex-
tensive surveillance “creep” (Lyon 2007, p. 52) of data 
to the police taken by the private CCTV cameras, which 
seems not to bother Greeks, as much as the police 
cameras do (Samatas, 2008, 2011). 
7. Concluding Remarks: Assessment and Prospects 
We have tried to elucidate here the features, functions, 
and impact of the “austerity surveillance” (AS) used by 
the extreme austerity regime in Greece. As we have 
sketched it, AS is a specific kind of coercive surveil-
lance, based mainly on “coveillance,” i.e., citizen in-
formers’ grassing, naming, and shaming, public stigma-
tization and punishment, as a domination and 
disciplinary control mechanism of the Greek population. It 
functions under the Troika’s supervision in a post-
democratic and neoliberal setting, violating human 
rights and shredding social cohesion. Moreover, AS has 
a class orientation against the lower economic classes, 
while covering up the elite. Its neoliberal, antidemo-
cratic, and unjust nature deprives AS of any legitimacy 
and citizens’ trust. 
AS in current Greece is not an original type of sur-
veillance; we observe some basic similarities of this 
type of AS with past anticommunist surveillance (Sa-
matas, 2004); while the Greek anticommunist state and 
regime used an authoritarian repressive surveillance 
apparatus, targeting leftists, communists, sympathiz-
ers, and anti-regime opponents, and was far more re-
pressive and exclusionary (Samatas, 2004), the austeri-
ty regime, and its AS, targets public employees, 
professional groups (e.g. medical doctors), and petty 
store owners as tax evaders, as well as the poor wel-
fare recipients. AS also has similarities to antiterrorist 
surveillance in the USA (Goldstein, 2002; Lyon, 2003), 
and “marginalizing surveillance” of welfare recipients 
(Monahan, 2010, p. 10). In fact, as we have mentioned, 
several features of AS are imported from other ad-
vanced surveillance societies, such as that of the UK 
(Rowlands, 2013). All these surveillance types, includ-
ing the totalitarian one like that of the Stasi in East 
Germany (Funder, 2003; Schmeidel, 2008), are cultivat-
ing and using citizens as spies.  
We could agree that Greece is being used by the 
Troika as an austerity laboratory (Douzinas, 2013), us-
ing austerity surveillance to produce discipline and 
control for further potential use beyond the Greek 
case, in other over-indebted countries. However, the 
Greek austerity regime and its AS have failed; Greeks 
have rejected their victimization. The election victory 
of the anti-austerity government on January 25, 2015 
and the “No” victory on the referendum of July 5, 
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2015, against the new austerity measures, illustrate that 
the austerity regime and austerity surveillance have 
failed to fulfill their basic mission to make Greek people 
fearful and disciplined, under an austerity straightjacket. 
Moreover, these draconian policies have contributed 
to their resistance and defiance, even if this puts 
Greece at risk of being kicked out of the Eurozone.  
Although we do not have space to analyze them 
here, there are two basic reasons in our view that AS 
has failed like the anticommunist one has in the past. 
The first reason is the anti-surveillance culture in the 
country, due to the authoritarian past of Greece (Sa-
matas, 2011); the second significant reason is the pow-
erful Greek “bonding” social capital, that is, according 
to Daniel P. Aldrich (2012), the relationships a person 
has with family and friends, which make it also the 
strongest form of social capital. Therefore, we declare 
our disbelief of the efficiency of AS and on the magni-
tude of citizens’ snitching and their results, despite the 
regime’s propaganda. 
Financial crimes and corruption (Lambropoulou, 
2011) are real serious problems of the Greek state and 
society, rooted since the founding of the modern Greek 
state. Coercive austerity surveillance has not and can-
not resolve these problems. Greece urgently needs an 
efficient state apparatus and a legitimate surveillance 
mechanism, trusted by citizens, one working with jus-
tice and accountability, respect for human and demo-
cratic rights, and without discrimination against the 
poor and needy. 
Let’s finish by interpreting the aforementioned 
Panoptes myth in this time of austerity, considering the 
new Greek anti-austerity government, which came to 
power on January 25, 2015, and the prime minister 
Alexis Tsipras as the Hermes who had the mandate of 
the Greek people (Zeus) to kill Panoptes (austerity sur-
veillance) in order to liberate Io (Greece), displeasing 
Hera (the Eurozone and/or Chancellor Angela Merkel). 
For the time being, Hermes (Tsipras) has been defeated 
and humiliated by the Eurozone. Despite this fact, the 
Greek people have given him a second chance, winning 
the elections of September 20, 2015. It seems he has 
two choices now: either to buy time, trying a more fea-
sible project and even a more useful one by softening 
the austerity measures for the lower classes and tam-
ing Panoptes with democratic control, targeting the re-
al rich “big fishes” of tax evasion; and then there is also 
the realist option for Hermes (Tsipras) to ignore his ini-
tial mandate to kill Panoptes (and austerity) and simply 
become a populist manager, reproducing a kind of 
softer “leftist” austerity Panoptes control mechanism, 
satisfying the lenders and deceiving the Greek people. 
We’ll see… 
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